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Washoe Cty. Sch. Dist. v. White, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 43 (June 29, 2017)1 
 
CONTRACT LAW: ARBITRATION AWARDS 
 
Summary 
 
Kara White (“White”) was terminated from her role as elementary school principal after 
the school district’s decision to terminate her was affirmed in an arbitration hearing. White filed a 
motion to vacate the award in district court. The district court granted White’s motion, holding 
that (1) the arbitrator exceeded his authority, (2) the arbitrator manifestly disregarded NRS 
391.3116, and (3) the award was arbitrary and capricious. The school district appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Nevada, which reversed the district court’s ruling.  
 
Background 
 
From 2008 to 2013, Kara White (“White”) was employed as a principal for a Washoe 
County elementary school. White was a member of respondent Washoe School Principals’ 
Association (“WSPA”), and WSPA and the appellant Washoe County School District (“District”) 
were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) governing the District’s employment 
terms.  
During White’s first year in her role as principal, she was trained on school funds use, 
including use of student activity funds (“SAFs”). In 2009, White’s school was audited. The audit 
report revealed that the school had improperly used SAFs, and that White had signed off on checks 
she had issued to herself. The District discussed the report with White and told her to reference the 
SAFs manual (Manual). In writing, White responded that she would no longer permit or engage in 
the improper use of SAFs.  
In 2013, upon a staff member’s report of White’s improper use of school funds, the District 
began an investigation, which included a SAFs audit from 2011 to 2013. The audit revealed that 
over $9,000 of the school’s SAFs expenditures were inappropriate. White was notified that her 
actions violated NRS 391.312 for: 
 
(c) Unprofessional conduct; . . . (i) Inadequate 
performance; . . . (k) Failure to comply with such 
reasonable requirements as a board may prescribe; 
(1) Failure to show normal improvement and 
evidence of professional training and growth; . . . (p) 
Dishonesty. 
 
The District found that White’s responses to the audit were “less than credible” since she 
claimed to be unaware of the Manual. As such, the District concluded that White’s responses were 
“dishonest,” and resulted in violation of NRS 391.312 for “[d]ishonesty.” The District’s deputy 
superintendent upheld the termination recommendation, and White appealed the termination 
decision to arbitration.  
The arbitration hearing was held in 2014, and was administered by arbitrator Alexander 
Cohn. Arbitrator Cohn affirmed White’s termination because “she was discharged for just cause” 
                                                 
1  By Margarita Elias. 
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for her dishonesty in the matter. White filed a motion to vacate the award in district court, which 
the district court granted. It held that (1) Arbitrator Cohn exceeded his authority, (2) Arbitrator 
Cohn manifestly disregarded NRS 391.3116, and (3) the Award was arbitrary and capricious. The 
District filed the instant appeal. 
 
Discussion 
 
Arbitrator Cohn did not exceed his authority 
 
“The Nevada Arbitration Act provides specific grounds for invalidating an arbitration 
award. NRS 38.241(1)(d) dictates that a court shall vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator 
exceeded his powers.”2 In particular, “[A]rbitrators exceed their powers when they address issues 
or make awards outside the scope of the governing contract.”3 Moreover, an arbitrator “is not free 
to contradict the express language of the contract.”4 However, “[a]rbitrators do not exceed their 
powers if their interpretation of an agreement, even if erroneous, is rationally grounded in the 
agreement.”5 Accordingly, “[a]n award should be enforced so long as the arbitrator is arguably 
construing or applying the contract” and “there is a colorable justification for the outcome.”6 
 Here, there is justification for White’s termination, and it does not contradict the CBA’s 
express language. Specifically, Article 1.18 states: 
 
Disciplinary actions. . . taken against post- 
probationary unit members. . . shall be  
progressive in nature and related to the nature of the 
infraction. Unit members shall be given reasonable 
opportunity for improvement.  
 
The School District shall not discharge . . . a post 
probationary bargaining unit member of this unit 
without just cause.7  
 
White argued that that the arbitrator’s award contradicted the plain language of Article 18.1 
because her termination was not “progressive in nature.” The Court reasoned that Article 18.1 also 
requires that the phrase “related to the nature of the infraction” qualify the phrase “progressive in 
nature,” and the two combine to modify “[d]isciplinary actions.” Accordingly, the Court 
determined that Article 18.1 served to preclude the District from choosing disciplinary actions that 
were disproportionate to the misconduct, while allowing the District to impose more severe 
penalties for repeated infractions. Indeed, under White’s interpretation, an employee’s first offense 
                                                 
2  Health Plan of Nev., Inc. v. Rainbow Med., L.L.C., 120 Nev. 689, 697, 100 P.3d 172, 178 (2004) (internal citation 
omitted). 
3  Id. 
4  Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1285 v. City of Las Vegas, 107 Nev. 906, 910, 823 P.2d 877, 879 (1991). 
5  Id. at 698, 100 P.3d at 178. 
6  Id. 
7  (Emphasis added). 
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of misconduct could not result in termination, no matter how severe, and would render the term 
“related to the nature of the infraction” meaningless.8  
 
Two common-law grounds in Nevada for reviewing private binding arbitration awards 
 
 In Nevada, there are two common-law grounds recognized “under which a court may 
review private binding arbitration awards: (1) whether the award is arbitrary, capricious, or 
unsupported by the agreement; and (2) whether the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.”9 
Notably, “the former standard ensures that the arbitrator does not disregard the facts or the terms 
of the arbitration agreement,” while “the latter standard ensures that the arbitrator recognizes 
applicable law.”10  
  
Arbitrator Cohn did not manifestly disregard the law 
 
The award provides that (1) “any inclination to reverse [White’s] discharge and substitute 
progressive discipline[,] such as . . . an opportunity to improve . . . , is washed away by the 
dishonesty finding”; and (2) “the District has carried its burden to show [that White] violated 
NRS 391.[3]12(1)(c); (i); (k); (l); (p).” Based on this language, White argued that Arbitrator Cohn 
manifestly disregarded NRS 391.311611 by ignoring the CBA’s Article 18.1 and relying on 
NRS 391.312412 in finding just cause to discharge her. The Court disagreed.  
“[J]udicial inquiry under the manifest-disregard-of-the-law standard is extremely 
limited.”13 Thus, “the issue is not whether the arbitrator correctly interpreted the law, but whether 
the arbitrator, knowing the law and recognizing that the law required a particular result, simply 
disregarded the law.”14  
 Here, Arbitrator Cohn cited to NRS 391.3116 in a footnote, which states “NRS 391.3116 
provides that a [CBA] may super[s]ede the provisions of NRS 391.311 to 391.397.” Despite the 
fact that the footnote misstates NRS 391.3116’s language by characterizing its mandatory 
exclusion of the relevant statutes as being optional, “we may not concern ourselves with the 
correctness of the arbitrator’s interpretation of [NRS 391.3116].”15  
 
 
                                                 
8  See Musser v. Bank of Am., 114 Nev. 945, 949, 964 P.2d 51, 54 (1998) (providing that “[a] court should not interpret 
a contract so as to make meaningless its provisions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
9  Clark Cty. Educ. Ass’n v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 122 Nev. 337, 341, 131 P.3d 5, 8 (2006). 
10  Id. 
11  NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.3116 (2013) (replaced in revision by NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.660 in 2015) provides that 
“the provisions of NRS 391.311 to 391.3197, inclusive, do not apply to a . . . licensed employee who has entered into 
a contract with the board negotiated pursuant to chapter 288 of NRS if the contract contains separate provisions 
relating to the board’s right to dismiss . . . the employee.” 
12  NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.312 (2011) (substituted in revision by NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.31297 in 2013 and then by 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.750 in 2015) provides that “an administrator may be . . . dismissed . . . for the following 
reasons: . . .  [u]nprofessional conduct; ... [i]nadequate performance; ... [f]ailure to comply with such reasonable 
requirements as a board may prescribe; [f]ailure to show normal improvement and evidence of professional training 
and growth; . . .  [d]ishonesty.” 
13  Clark Cty. Educ. Ass’n, 122 Nev. at 342, 131 P.3d at 8 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
14  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
15  Clark Cty. Educ. Ass’n, 122, Nev. at 345, 131 P.3d at 10. 
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 The Award is neither arbitrary nor capricious 
 
“The arbitrary-and-capricious standard does not permit a reviewing court to vacate an 
arbitrator’s award based on a misinterpretation of the law.”16 Rather, a court’s review of this 
standard is “limited to whether the arbitrator’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in 
the record.”17 
Here, sufficient evidence existed to support Arbitrator Cohn’s “dishonesty” finding. 
Arbitrator Cohn examined the arbitration proceedings’ records and concluded that White’s alleged 
lack of understanding in regard to SAFs use and her inability to recall the Manual was so 
implausible that her responses during the investigatory meeting were dishonest. The Court also 
reasoned that sufficient evidence existed because, inter alia, SAFs training was provided during 
White’s first year as a principal; after the 2009 random audit White was specifically told to 
reference the Manual; and a copy of the Manual was available at White’s school and on the 
school’s website. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The Court concluded that Arbitrator Cohn did not exceed his authority in affirming White’s 
termination. The Court further held that Arbitrator Cohn did not manifestly disregard the law and 
that his decision was not arbitrary or capricious. As such, the Court reversed the district court’s 
order granting White’s motion to vacate the award.  
 
 
                                                 
16  Clark Cty. Educ. Ass’n, 122 Nev. at 343–44, 131 P.3d at 9 (emphasis added). 
17  Id. at 344, 131 P.3d at 9–10. 
